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At 9:15am on Friday 21 October 1966 a waste 
tip slid down a mountainside into the mining 
village of Aberfan near Merthyr Tydfil, South 
Wales.  It first destroyed a farm cottage in its 
path, killing all the occupants.  At Pantglas 
Junior School, just below, the children were 
in their classrooms beginning the last day 
before half-term1.  It was sunny on the 
mountain but foggy in the village, with 
visibility about 50 yards.  The tipping gang 
up on the mountain had seen the slide start, 
but could not raise the alarm because their 
telephone cable had been repeatedly stolen.  
(The Tribunal of Inquiry later established 
that the disaster happened so quickly that 
a telephone warning would not have saved 
lives.2)  Down in the village nobody saw 
anything, but everybody heard the noise.
Gaynor Minett, an eight-year-old at the 
school, remembered four years later:
“It was a tremendous rumbling sound and 
all the school went dead.  You could hear a 
pin drop.  Everyone just froze in their seats.  
I just managed to get up and I reached the 
end of my desk when the sound got louder 
and nearer, until I could see the black out of 
the window.  I can’t remember any more but 
I woke up to find that a horrible nightmare 
had just begun in front of my eyes.3”
The slide engulfed the school and about 
20 houses in the village before coming to 
rest.  Then there was total silence.  George 
Williams, who was trapped in the wreckage, 
remembered that “… in that silence you 
couldn’t hear a bird or a child.”
144 people died in the Aberfan disaster; 116 
of them were school children.  About half of 
the children at Pantglas Junior School, and 
five of their teachers, were killed.
So horrifying was the disaster that everybody 
wanted to do something.  Hundreds of 
people stopped what they were doing, threw 
a shovel in the car, and drove to Aberfan to 
try and help with the rescue.  It was futile: 
the untrained rescuers merely got in the way 
of the trained rescue teams.  Nobody was 
rescued alive after 11:00am on the day of the 
disaster, but it was nearly a week before all 
the bodies were recovered4.
Lessons from yesteryear … but 
still equally valid today?
In 1967 – less than a year after the disaster 
itself – Tony Austin wrote a very powerful 
and moving book entitled Aberfan: The 
Story of a Disaster5.  The book was dedicated 
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to “… the hope that lessons will not only 
be appreciated but applied.”  Owing to 
the passage of time and the withdrawal 
of the volume from public libraries in the 
intervening 50 years it’s not an easy book to 
obtain, although copies occasionally appear 
on internet auction sites and of course a 
reference copy is available in the British 
Library for those so inclined to search it out.
Having recounted the story of the Aberfan 
disaster, Austin adds a personal note in 
Chapter 12 in which he reflects on the events 
and one of the original aims of the book.  
He says: “While the precautionary lessons of 
coal board failure before October 21 were 
acted upon promptly, might not there also 
be lessons from that muddled scramble out 
of which a rescue operation emerged, more 
by just happening than any design?”  What 
follows that question is a remarkable list of 
12 lessons emerging from the response to 
Aberfan, not captured by an author with any 
professional interest in disaster management 
but by a concerned layman who recognised 
that an analysis of the response to one 
incident – his incident – could lead to lessons 
being learned to improve the response to 
future emergencies.  In Austin’s own words in 
the introduction to his book:
“There is no suggestion that action, or 
lack of action, during the rescue operation 
caused further unnecessary loss of life.  All 
who went to Aberfan acted to the full 
extent of their ability.  Yet if that ability 
is sometimes in question who shall be the 
judge of effort in the face of an appalling 
situation, emotionally explosive, without 
the guidelines of precedent?  But there 
is another vital and valid question: what 
would have happened given the same rescue 
operation in circumstances in which life 
could still be saved?  It is within the context 
of the second question that a major part of 
this book is set.”
The set of 12 recommendations is striking 
to today’s student or practitioner of civil 
emergency management and will instantly 
strike a chord in terms of similarities with 
some of today’s ongoing issues.
Table 1: Lessons identified from the Aberfan disaster (Austin, 1967)
Lessons Learned Remarks
1. Clear and instant recognition that the officials, headed 
by the Chief Constable in whose area a disaster occurs, 
assume at least initial responsibility.  Coupled with an 
understanding on their part that in catastrophe the army 
can provide – under the command of the civil authority –  
a disciplined body of men, complete with communications.  
At Aberfan eight hours elapsed before a command structure 
even began to be generally understood.  The objection that 
smaller local authorities do not have the ability or resources 
to cope with major emergencies will be overcome by the 
reorganisation of local government into larger units6.
‘Clear and instant recognition’ – surely exactly the same issue which 
has most recently been tackled by the JESIP programme and the 
drive for tabard use across the emergency services (particularly the 
police) and not just the fire and rescue service as keen advocates 
of the incident command system7.  If anyone thinks that the JESIP 
principles are new then perhaps they should think again – they are 
simply the most recent reincarnation of a set of fundamentals which 
have been highlighted time after time in the aftermath of major 
incidents in the past.
This recommendation is of particular interest to anyone who ever 
wondered why the default chair of the Strategic Co-ordinating 
Group in the immediate response phase of a ‘no notice’ civil 
emergency is a chief officer of police of the host Home Office force8 
and also to those interested in the beginnings of the Military Aid to 
the Civil Authorities scheme.
2. Need for a main headquarters, away from the site, to direct 
overall policy and handle offers of help, in liaison with an 
operational headquarters on-site to conduct the rescue 
operation unhampered by non-essential people – plus an 
administrative headquarters at the approach to the site to 
regulate essential personnel and equipment.  At Aberfan a 
main headquarters was established officially; an operational 
headquarters on-site grew of its own accord; a conveniently 
situated administrative headquarters was never set up.
Again, the experience of responding to Aberfan is reflected in 
modern day practice including the remote Strategic Co-ordinating 
Group (SCG) established in the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) 
and JESIP principle of co-location of on-scene commanders.
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Lessons Learned Remarks
3. Immediate appointment of a quartermaster through whom 
all requests for materials should go to avoid who-ordered-
what arguments when the bills come in.  At Aberfan 
there was no quartermaster and no effective, embracing 
ordering system.
4. Proper signposting of the main offices.  At Aberfan this did 
not happen until the army came in.
5. The effective cordoning of the immediate area.  At Aberfan 
this was not done effectively until the army came in, at 
which time it was of little more value than a late gesture.
Again, cordoning forms a fundamental element of the incident 
command system7 embedded in emergency response across the UK 
(and elsewhere).
6. Good liaison and communications, pre-requisites of smooth 
control, invariably lacking at first, can soon be achieved 
through police-fire-ambulance radio communications 
backed by Home Office and GPO9 radio and telephone 
assistance.  At Aberfan it was not realised soon enough 
that the Home Office and GPO were capable of providing 
efficient communications in an emergency.
Older members of the UK’s emergency services – and particularly 
those closely involved in the specialism of major incident planning – 
will recall that ‘blue light’ interoperable radio communications in the 
pre-Airwave era were provided by the Home Office UHF Channels 69 
(simplex) and 70 (half duplex).  However, they were rarely used and 
often only available in radios installed on, or available within, major 
incident or command units and not on a day-to-day basis.
Since the introduction of Airwave and the universal availability 
of interoperable voice communications (IVC) talkgroups the 
establishment of on-scene command networks has become easier 
and is encouraged by JESIP to reinforce the principle of co-location.  
However, just as the technological capability provided by Airwave 
seems to be better understood by frontline commanders (encouraged, 
no doubt, by mandatory JESIP training) the system’s demise looms 
on the horizon and the equivalent capabilities of the new Emergency 
Services’ Mobile Communications Project (ESMCP) will need 
to be understood.
It is interesting that in 1966, a central government department was 
able to provide a bespoke operational communications capability 
– not something we would necessarily expect today (unless it 
happened to be in development via a centrally-sponsored project 
by, say, the Centre for Applied Science and Technology (formerly the 
Home Office Scientific Development Branch).  A similar capability 
was provided by the Home Office to the Moorgate tube disaster 
some nine years later when the experimental Figaro system was 
used to enhance underground radio communications at the London 
Underground station10.
See also BT civil resilience capabilities.
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Lessons from the past – never 
too late to learn?
On 8 September 2016, Cardiff University’s 
School of Journalism, Media and Cultural 
Studies held a one-day conference focussing 
on the themes of remembering, forgetting 
and moving on in the media and in the 
community11 12.  It brought together survivors 
of the tragedy, media practitioners and 
academics including photojournalist I. C. 
(‘Chuck’13) Rapoport whose presentation was 
breathtakingly poignant and moved many to 
tears, and the elder statesman of the Welsh 
media, Vincent Kane, who reported from 
Aberfan in 1966.
Lessons Learned Remarks
7. Understanding that liaison means everyone knowing who 
is in charge and all subordinate commanders making their 
presence known to the main control first.  At Aberfan some 
organisations worked independently, partly due to the 
failure of the main control to create a situation in which 
they could only work through an operational headquarters.
8. WRVS, Red Cross, St John Ambulance, Salvation Army and 
any other voluntary organisation should work together 
under one joint command, responsible to one control.  At 
Aberfan the voluntary organisations did fine work, on a 
competitive rather than coordinated basis.
9. Integration of medical services.  At Aberfan the hospital’s 
disaster plan worked well, but it was almost overwhelmed 
by the volume of uncoordinated medical help available.
10. All in authority to be instantly recognisable.  Uniforms are 
the obvious identification, and those likely to be involved in 
emergencies should always have their uniforms at hand.  A 
further aid could be the permanent issue of cheap brightly 
coloured plastic helmets to a limited number of non-
uniformed key personnel.  At Aberfan those with authority 
and without identification were at a distinct disadvantage.
See the remarks annotated against lesson #1 above and the 
fundamental similarity with the recent JESIP drive towards the 
universal use of identifying tabards.
11. An understanding with rescue organisations and with press 
and broadcasting authorities that all appeals for aid should 
emanate from one official source only.  At Aberfan there 
was a failure to use methods of communication properly; 
when they were used wrong information was given.
See BBC Connecting in a Crisis.
12. The need for a simple Home Office instruction on disaster 
procedure to local authorities and organisations likely to be 
involved in disaster operations, defining their approach and 
responsibility.
The Home Office subsequently published the first edition of Dealing 
with Disaster, with the revised third edition being published by 
the Cabinet Office (owing to machinery of Government changes 
in the intervening years) before subsequently being superseded 
by Emergency Response and Recovery – Non statutory guidance 
accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
Kane gave a journalist’s judgement on those 
to blame for the tip slide that engulfed 
Pantglas school and its neighbouring homes, 
as well as the way in which the community 
was treated afterwards.  He believes that 
there was a conspiracy of silence before the 
disaster among those who knew of the real 
danger that No. 7 tip could slide and was 
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devastating in his condemnation of both the 
National Coal Board and the National Union 
of Mineworkers.  They had known about 
the tip being built upon two underground 
springs on a sloping hillside clearly shown 
on Ordnance Survey maps.  They were, he 
said, “guilty of moral cowardice”14  – failing 
to act on the knowledge that the tip could 
slide at any moment.  But those who knew 
of the potential for tragedy failed to act 
because they knew that attempting to do 
so would put the existence of mining in 
Merthyr (and beyond) in peril.  In his keynote 
address15 delivered in a “… beautifully 
passionate, poetic, angry and robust”  
manner, Kane said:
“The Tribunal report said there were no 
villains at Aberfan16.  Yes there was, there was 
one big villain.  Coal.  King Coal to which we 
all paid grateful homage in Wales for most 
of the twentieth century.  It was coal and 
the determination to keep producing it at 
all costs which caused the tip slide, it was 
coal which killed the children and it was coal 
and the desperate fear of losing it which 
prompted the dereliction of duty before the 
disaster and the cover-ups and half-truths 
which followed.”
The conference was also attended by some 
of the survivors of the disaster and in the 
first session some of them rose to their feet 
to speak for the first time in 50 years about 
what they went through on the day.  Yvonne 
Price from Merthyr Tydfil, one of the first 
police officers on the scene and being of 
petite stature, gave a harrowing account of 
being sent through a small hole and into 
one of the classrooms of Pantglas school 
where she spent the rest of the day passing 
children – dead and alive – back out to the 
rescuers outside.  When she reported for duty 
on the second day, she was assigned to the 
chapel where a body holding area had been 
established and subsequently became, in her 
words, the “mortician’s assistant” where they 
were given brandy to drink all day and they 
slept in coffins when they were tired.  She 
said she had kept it to herself for 45 years 
but finally “… had to get it out of my system” 
seven years ago.
Gaynor Madgwick also noted that there 
were some in the community still not ready 
to speak about what happened.  “There are 
people at the moment … one woman is 
seeing a psychiatrist because she cannot face 
the 50th anniversary.  She knows it will open 
so many wounds.  She doesn’t know how 
she’s going to cope.  Others who are in their 
70s, 80s, 90s want to tell their stories because 
an end is coming.”
The opposing views which emerged through 
the discussion were also striking: on the one 
hand, some survivors who had been relatively 
vocal about their experiences in the last five 
decades were asking “What is there left to 
say after 50 years?”  Others are only now, 
after 50 years, feeling able to start to talk 
about their experiences. The question which 
might arise for those charged with planning 
the response to future disasters is:
“How do we make sure that the lessons which 
are possibly yet to emerge from those who 
are only just starting to feel able to talk 
about their experiences are captured and 
learned – especially when others seem to 
want to finally lay their experiences to rest?”
Conclusion
As the media spotlight fell on Aberfan 
once again some 53 years after tragedy 
struck, the two principal points emerging 
from this discussion may perhaps be 
summarised as follows:
1. Never forget the lessons of the past 
– many of them, albeit in their most 
fundamental form, will still be relevant 
to professional practice today; and
2. Don’t assume that the passing of time 
means that every lesson which can be 
learnt has been learnt.  Some people 
may not start talking about their 
experiences until many years later and 
they may be the very people who can 
provide insights into things which, 
in their valuable experience, can be 
improved in the future. 
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